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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been part of a long chain of monarchies that have periodically ruled over the Arabian Peninsula. However, the 
House of Saud has not had a long rule over the region. The Kingdom came 
to existence in 1932 and since the consolidation of power it has encountered 
a host of problems, from creating a cohesive identity for the country to rally 
behind to challenging the King’s authority to challenging the security of the 
nation from international actors. The Kingdom itself has historically been 
reliant upon foreign powers providing military aid to protect the country. 
However, in recent years, as Western powers have steadily increased 
and decreased their roles in the region, instability across the Middle East 
has increased dramatically. Additionally, Iran, the traditional enemy of the 
Saudi Arabia, has steadily expanded its nuclear weapons program and 
taken advantage of the retreat of the US to further entrench its power in 
the Middle East. Thus, the quandary that the Kingdom finds itself in is how 
to best ensure its security in the face of their enemy becoming a hegemon 
and a retreat of their western allies from the region. The Kingdom has clear 
ambitions in its foreign policy that come from a decision-making calculus 
with plenty of inputs to create a variety of possible decisions about how 
best to act. Understanding the inputs that go into the decision-making 
process and which pieces of information are most valued in the decision-
making process help the US government to better prepare to deal with the 
Kingdom. Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions are informed by a desire to 
defend the security interests of the nation in the face of a more powerful 
Iran rather than looking to defend an acquired identity as leader of the 
Arab-Muslim world.
Saudi Arabia’s desire to become a nuclear power stems from a 
historical conflict with Iran. Iran has been an enemy of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia since the revolution of 1979. Before the revolution, the Shah 
of Iran and the King of Saudi Arabia cooperated on much in regard to 
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securing the legitimacy of their thrones. “Arab nationalism, born in the 
era of anti-colonial struggle, often equated the monarchial system with 
colonial cronyism. Therefore, monarchies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia 
considered Arab nationalism an immediate danger.”1 However, in the post-
revolution world, Iran attacked the Saudi Kingdom with claims of it being 
anti-Islamic, which then prompted a war of words between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran: 
By declaring Islam to be the basis of the Iranian republic and 
by propagating the establishment of an Islamic state in Iran, the 
clerical leadership was competing with the Al Sa’ud on their own 
turf. The claim that they were ruling according to Islamic norms 
and traditions and looking after the safety of the holy places 
in Mecca and Medina had been the Al Sa’ud’s most important 
argument for legitimacy. Furthermore, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution, propagated 
the notion that a monarchy was basically non-Islamic and 
that a republic was the only form of state adequate to Islam. 
Consequently, a Saudi counter-campaign denounced the 
insufficiencies of the revolutionary regime in Iran and described 
it ultimately as “non-Islamic.” By mid-1980 at the latest, all 
political signals in the Gulf region pointed to confrontation. Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, allied during the 1970s, had become bitter 
opponents. For many Saudi princes, the Iranian foreign policy 
credo of exporting the revolution seemed even more dangerous 
than the pan-Arabist maneuvers of Iraq, which had been 
successfully contained during the past decade.2
The alliance between the two states was no longer a possibility as the two 
nations no longer had common ground. Iran was a Persian, Shi‘ite majority 
country now ruled by a theocratic elite. Saudi Arabia is an Arab, Sunni 
majority nation ruled by a monarchy that uses Islam as the justification for 
its rule. From here on, the House of Saud looked to contain the Marxist 
theocratic Iran and fortunately had an ally in the fight. The US, in the era of 
the Cold War, looked to restrict the anti-Western sentiments of the Iranian 
republic so that it may continue to acquire resources from the Middle East. 
As a result, the US and Saudi Arabia began to foster an alliance. Together 
they attempted to balance against Iran and keep them contained. However, 
in recent years the containment of Iran has become more difficult as 
instability in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen have presented opportunities for Iran 
    1    Henner Fürtig, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order 
and US Policy,” Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (2007) 627.
    2    Ibid., 629.
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to entrench its power in the region. To amplify this rise in Iranian power, the 
US has focused on getting rid of the Iranian nuclear program rather than 
curbing its influence in other nations. 
While the Iranian nuclear program dates back to the Shah, the 
reactors were exclusively used to generate energy until the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.3 Here the leadership of Iran decided to expand their nuclear 
program to begin to develop weapons and a short nuclear breakout time. 
This means that Iran is looking to quickly develop nuclear weapons, should 
it need them, but not necessarily to constantly have nuclear warheads. The 
US responded swiftly in applying pressure to eliminate those supplying 
nuclear technology to Iran.4 The US has since focused on applying 
sanctions on Iran to cease all nuclear weapons development and submit 
to international inspections to ensure they are complying with international 
nuclear energy standards. This stems from the desire to prevent Iran from 
arming itself with nuclear weapons and enforcing its anti-Western sentiment 
across the region. Currently, Saudi Arabia has chosen to remain a non-
nuclear armed state and to not seek weapons. However, the Kingdom has 
recently begun to negotiate with the US in an attempt to gain more nuclear 
reactors and also homegrown uranium enrichment plants.5 This puts the 
nation on par with Iran in providing a quick nuclear breakout time. However, 
there is one thing that Iran has that Saudi Arabia doesn’t: the ability to 
domestically produce ballistic missiles. Iran has had this domestic program 
for a long time; little open-source information exists about its capabilities, 
but it is known is that the program is advanced relative to the country’s 
capabilities.6 This missile program provides a perfect delivery method for 
any nuclear warhead Iran develops. Thus, the Saudis’ fear is that should 
Iran continue along its path it will have nuclear weapons and the Saudis 
will have nothing to combat the threat posed to their nation by having a 
hostile nuclear armed neighbor. 
The first interpretation of international relations that can explain 
the behavior of Saudi Arabia is the realist tradition as pioneered by Hans 
Morgenthau. To a realist, Saudi Arabia desires a nuclear deterrent to 
combat Iran’s nuclear weapons and ambitions. Realism emerged in the 
post-World-War world when the global institutions, such as the League 
of Nations, desired to perfect society and create everlasting peace which 
utterly failed. After almost 40 years of fighting, which tore the world apart, 
    3    Robert J. Reardon, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Past, Present, and Future,” &RQWDLQLQJ
,UDQ6WUDWHJLHVIRU$GGUHVVLQJWKH,UDQLDQ1XFOHDU&KDOOHQJH (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 2012) 10-11.
    4    Ibid., 13.
    5    Mahmoud Habboush and Bruce Stanley, “Why Oil-Rich Saudi Arabia is Turning to 
Nuclear Power,” %ORRPEHUJ%XVLQHVVZHHN, March 20, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-03-20/why-oil-rich-saudi-arabia-is-turning-to-nuclear-power-quicktake. 
    6    Reardon, 39-40.
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international relations theorists began to agree that the world was very 
similar to a global Machiavellian power struggle or a Hobbesian state of 
nature. In Hans Morgenthau’s book, 3ROLWLFV$PRQJ1DWLRQV, he writes: 
International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. 
Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power 
is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may 
ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. 
They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, 
economic, or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal 
will materialize through its own inner force, through divine 
intervention, or through the natural development of human 
affairs. But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means 
of international politics, they do so by striving for power.7
Rather than a world cooperating on transnational issues, every single 
interaction is an opportunity in which states may gain greater power or 
authority over others. Thus, cooperation is limited to times of absolute 
crisis or necessity. Since states seek survival as much as they seek power, 
cooperation is also limited to times in which every state that is cooperating 
in the “alliance” will equally benefit. In his book, Morgenthau also outlines 
the elements of power, which consist of geography, natural resources, 
industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, 
national morale, and quality of diplomacy.8 Morgenthau’s focus is on the 
ability for a state to translate its “nascent power” into military power.9 By 
this, Morgenthau means the ability to mobilize your entire state for a war, 
or at least appropriate the proper amount of resources required by the 
military. In this sense, the world is an arms race in which everyone attempts 
to grab as much nascent power as they can to turn into real military power 
when the time comes. Considering that every state desires power means 
that the likelihood of forming alliances is close to none. This is because 
your ally one day can easily become your enemy the next day if that state 
now perceives you as a threat to their power. 
 Given this theoretical paradigm, let’s apply it to modern day 
Saudi Arabia. To fully understand this there are a couple of basic factors 
relating to Saudi Arabia that have to be understood. In 2015, according to 
Observatory for Economic Complexity, 55 percent of the 183 billion dollars’ 
worth of exports of the nation of Saudi Arabia came from crude petroleum.10 
    7    Hans J. Morgenthau, 3ROLWLFV$PRQJ1DWLRQV (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 13.
    8    Ibid., 80-105.
    9    Ibid., 14.
   10    Observatory for Economic Complexity (OEC), “Saudi Arabia,” accessed May 3, 
2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/sau/.
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The oil fields that provide the majority of the Kingdom’s wealth are located 
in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia that borders the Persian Gulf, 
Qatar, and Bahrain.11 This is also one of the least populated provinces of 
the country with most of the nation’s people living on the western coast 
area near Mecca and Medina.12 Most of the nation’s Shi’ite population lives 
in the Eastern Province in which the neighboring countries are also Shi’ite 
majority nations.13 The Kingdom exports most of its oil through the Strait of 
Hormuz that links the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean.14 On one side of 
the Strait is Oman and on the other side is Iran. 
Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has been an enemy of the House of 
Saud. Iran represents a rising regional power capable of challenging Saudi 
power in the region. Iran has taken advantage instability in the region by 
expanding its influence across several nations. In Syria, Iran has been 
able to maintain Assad as leader of the nation by enabling the Ayatollah to 
continue support of the vast networks of terrorists across the region: 
First, Assad won his war to stay in power. Granted, he rules 
a challenging, fragile, and fragmented Syria; one where 
violence will not cease in the coming years nor will efforts to 
unseat him…Iran, despite profound and persistent domestic 
political and economic vulnerabilities, has demonstrated an 
unwavering commitment to its mission in Syria, increasingly 
purchasing another strategic border with Israel. Working by, 
with, and through Hezbollah, Iranian power projection across 
the Middle East has skyrocketed. Both Iran and Hezbollah are 
entrenched in Syria, which will make any U.S. efforts to counter 
their regional influence that much harder.15
Syria’s border with Lebanon allows Iran to provide more material support 
to Hezbollah as well as continue power projection in the region against 
Turkey and Israel, both of which were historically major US allies. Iran 
has also been focusing on other areas closer to Saudi Arabia. In Yemen, 
the decline of Ali Abdullah Saleh provided Iran a target of opportunity that 
enabled them to sow instability along the Saudi border.16 Saudi intervention 
   11    Stratfor Global Intelligence, 6DXGL$UDELD¶V*HRJUDSKLF&KDOOHQJH, December 5, 
2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LS4G0bvpwgc, 1:30.
   12    Ibid., 1:35.
   13    Ibid., 1:40.
   14    Ibid., 1:20.
   15    Mara Karlin,  “After 7 Years of War, Assad Has Won In Syria. What’s Next for 
Washington?” %URRNLQJV, February 13, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2018/02/13/after-7-years-of-war-assad-has-won-in-syria-whats-next-for-
washington/.
   16    Simon Henderson, “How the War in Yemen Explains the Future of Saudi Arabia,” 
November 8, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/saudi-arabia-
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in the conflict has only proven to be ineffective. “Despite the Saudi air 
force’s best efforts, it has failed to dislodge the Houthis. The UAE’s forces 
have been more successful in the south of the country, around the port 
city of Aden. But there it is challenged by al-Qaeda types who have turned 
the Yemeni hinterlands into their sanctuary.”17 Saudi Arabia’s inability to 
maintain the Peninsula free of Iranian influence has proven to be a major 
security risk for the Kingdom. On December 12th, an Iranian-made Burkhan 
2 ballistic missile was fired by the Houthi rebels at Riyadh.18 The missile 
was intercepted by the cities US-made Patriot missile defense batteries 
and no casualties or damage was sustained, but it remains a powerful 
reminder of how far Iran’s reach is.19
Additionally, Iraq has become an Iranian puppet thanks to the US’s 
failed attempt at regime change:
A new building goes up? It is likely that the cement and bricks 
came from Iran. And when bored young Iraqi men take pills 
to get high, the illicit drugs are likely to have been smuggled 
across the porous Iranian border. And that’s not even the half 
of it. Across the country, Iranian-sponsored militias are hard 
at work establishing a corridor to move men and guns to 
proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon. And in the halls of power 
in Baghdad, even the most senior Iraqi cabinet officials have 
been blessed, or bounced out, by Iran’s leadership.20
Thanks to the US ousting Saddam Hussein from power and the subsequent 
attempt to create a Western democracy, modern Iraq has fallen well under 
Iranian control. Iran is now perched on the northern and southern borders 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, posing a real threat to the security of the 
nation. Qatar, by nature of its shared oilfield with Iran and shared border 
with Saudi Arabia, has had to maintain good relations with both nations.21
Saudi Arabia has engaged in an air, sea, and land blockade of Qatar 
in conjunction with the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. This was because of 
the failure to meet a list of 13 demands, the first of which was to curb its 
relations with Iran.22 Saudi Arabia’s desired to prevent what happened in 
iran-yemen-houthi-salman/545336/.
   17    Ibid.
   18    “Yemen Rebel Ballistic Missile ‘Intercepted Over Riyadh’,” BBC, December 19, 201, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42412729.
   19    Ibid.
   20    Tim Arango, “Iran Dominates In Iraq After U.S. ‘Handed the Country Over’,” The 
1HZ<RUN7LPHV July 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/world/middleeast/
iran-iraq-iranian-power.html.
   21    “Qatar Crisis: What You Need To Know,” BBC, July 19, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-40173757.
   22    Ibid.
72   inter-text
6
Inter-Text: An Undergraduate Journal for Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 2 [2019], Art. 10
https://publications.lakeforest.edu/inter-text/vol2/iss1/10
Iraq and Yemen from happening again. So, a blockade of the country came 
to be in order to forcefully keep Qatar under the Kingdom’s control. 
On all fronts, Saudi Arabia has lost a lot of ground to Iran. The 
Kingdom has been looking to increase its defensive capabilities and not 
make the nation so reliant on oil as the main source of wealth. In the 
Vision 2030, released by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, it calls 
for a massive restructuring the economy that calls for 50 percent of all 
defense expenditures to be spent on domestically produced goods by 
2030.23 A homegrown defense industry is paramount to the defense of a 
nation, something that Morgenthau finds intrinsic in the calculation of a 
nation’s power.24 Additionally, the Vision 2030 calls for the Saudi economy 
to become an investment banking paradise.25 
Saudi Arabia has been looking to try and stop Iran’s growing 
influence in the region by supporting rebels and NATO in Syria, intervening 
in Yemen, and blockading Qatar. Currently, Saudi Arabia is finding little 
success in balancing against Iran; however, as Iranian influence grows, 
the Kingdom could very well seek a nuclear deterrent to more properly 
balance against a martially superior Iran with multiple powerful regional 
allies. The Kingdom’s principle enemy in the region has a very capable 
ballistic missile program, has shown itself to be willing to use it, and is 
focused on adopting the ability produce nuclear weapons should it decide 
it needs them. If Iran has all of this and more, Saudi Arabia’s security 
dilemma could very easily be evened out by adopting a similar strategy, 
especially given the considerable wealth advantage that the Kingdom has 
over Iran. 
The second alternative explanation for Saudi behavior in the 
international community can be taken from a constructivist viewpoint. 
Constructivism takes a step back from the normal positivist theories and 
instead looks at international relations through a more sociological lens:
Conventional constructivism, which is the school dominant in 
the US, examines the role of norms and...identity in shaping 
international political outcomes. These scholars are largely 
positivist in epistemological orientation and strong advocates 
of bridge-building among diverse theoretical perspectives; the 
qualitative, process-tracing case study is their methodological 
starting point. Sociology and elements of institutional/
organizational theory are sources of theoretical inspiration.26
   23    Mohammad Bin Salman BIN Abdulaziz Al-Saud, 9LVLRQ6DXGL$UDELD, 
Economic Report, Council of Economic and Development Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Riyadh: Council of Economic and Development Affairs, 48.
   24    Ibid.
   25    Ibid.
   26    Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics: A 
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Constructivism relies on the premise that “ideas construct realities; and 
that, all agents and structures are mutually constituted.”27 This means 
that an agent’s actions are based off the system as much as the system 
reacts to the agent. Or in simpler terms, the system is what states make 
of it. Scholars across all theoretical paradigms can agree that the system 
in which states operate is anarchy, where there is no singular sovereign 
ruling over other states. In this systems states can interpret the meaning of 
anarchy differently, a state could have a realist, liberal, or entirely unique 
interpretation of what anarchy means. This means that a state can act 
in the same system with completely different interpretations of the world. 
However, states are also influenced by their interactions with other states. 
For example, the US gained its identity as the preserver of the Western 
Liberal world during the Cold War against the Soviet Union that sought to 
end Western liberalism. In this way, states are socialized to act a certain 
way and thus gain an identity through socialization.
Saudi Arabia’s identity is relatively complex due to its complicated 
relationship with Islam. Saudi Arabia, largely due to its control of the cities 
of Mecca and Medina, is a deeply religious society. The House of Saud 
relies on religion as a source of legitimacy for their rule over the nation:
This sought identity is based primarily on strict observance 
of Islam and, of course, on loyalty to the House of Saud. The 
painstaking effort to expand its basis of legitimacy is the Saudi 
way of coping with whatever threatens the ruling dynasty, be it 
ambitious neighbors or radical ideologies from the outside, or 
domestic oppositions: ‘revolutionary’, anti-royalist, or religious 
fundamentalist. By employing religion for this purpose, the 
Saudi monarchy has actually availed itself of Islam to change 
the situation in which religion constitutes the predominant 
provider of the regime’s legitimacy.28
Saudi society has been cultivated around the transcendence of tribal bonds 
to create loyalty toward the royal family around a single Sunni Muslim 
Saudi identity. The King of Saudi Arabia is not only the chief executive 
and sole power of the nation, he is also the Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosques: Mecca and Medina.29 This signifies a greater authority than just 
Review Essay,” Review of International Studies, 30, no. 2 (2004) 230.
   27    Runa Das, “Critical Social Constructivism: ‘Culturing’ Identity, (In) Security, and the 
State In International Relations Theory,” 7KH,QGLDQ-RXUQDORI3ROLWLFDO6FLHQFH 70, no. 4 
(2009) 962.
   28    Joseph Nevo. “Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia.” Middle Eastern 
Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, 1998, pp. 36. 
   29   Paul Wood, “Life and legacy of King Fahd,” BBC News, August 1, 2005.. 
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ruler of a piece of land, but command over a religious identity that over 
twenty percent of the world’s population ascribes to.30 Islam is also heavily 
entrenched in Saudi society:
Saudi Arabia is the most theocratic state in the contemporary 
Sunni Muslim world. By definition, a non-Muslim cannot be 
a Saudi citizen. The idea of religious pluralism has neither 
meaning nor support in many segments of the population, 
and religious norms and practices are encouraged, promoted 
and even enforced by the state. The Saudi constitution is 
the Quran, and the shari’a is the source of its laws. Even the 
Basic Law of Government (al-nizam al-asasi li’l hukm), issued 
in 1992, stressed their supremacy. Moreover, in order to 
underline that there is no other, mundane source of legislation, 
the use of terms such as qanun (law) and musharr’i (legislator) 
are practically forbidden as they imply Western-style statutory 
enactment. They are substituted by nizam (regulation) and 
marsum (decree), which are supposed to complement the 
shari’a, not to take its place.31
Saudi society is molded almost entirely around the Quran as matter of 
further entrenching the idea that tribal allegiances do not matter nearly as 
much as the Islamic identity that all citizens must share in. Without this 
Islamic identity, it is highly likely that Saudi Arabia would be significantly 
less stable. However, there is also a distinction to be made about which 
sect of Islam drives this identity.
The Wahhabi school of Sunni Muslim thought has heavily influenced 
Saudi society. Wahhabis believe that it is necessary to return to the original 
ways in which the Prophet Muhammad and his first followers practiced 
Islam.32 They also followed a belief called tawhid, which translates to the 
“oneness of God.”33 God is omnipotent and the only being who is all powerful. 
No object or individual could obtain divinity so no one can mediate between 
the mortals and God. Anyone who follows someone who is claiming to be 
an intermediary between God and earth is a polytheist and a heretic.34 This 
led to the ostracizing of the chief preacher of Wahhabism, Muhammed Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab, until an alliance was formed with the House of Saud.35 
   30   “The Global Religious Landscape.” The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. 3HZ
Research Center. 18 December 2012. Accessed 18 March 2018. 
   31    Nevo, 40.
   32    Ibid., 36.
   33    Ibid., 37.
   34    Ibid.  
   35    Ibid.
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Muhammed Ibn Saud realized that Wahhabism had additional beneficial 
factors as developing a strong identity that super cedes tribal identities to 
be ruled by a central state:
That bond between umara and ulama (statesmen and 
divines) marks the modern inception of the use of religion as 
an instrument for both consolidating a collective identity and 
legitimizing the ruling family. It served the interests of the two 
parties, in the spirit of the political writing of Ibn Taymiyya. This 
scholar, whose most stringent interpretation of the teachings 
of Ibn Hanbal (founder of the most orthodox of the four Islamic 
schools) was adopted by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, 
held that religion and state are indissolubly linked. Without the 
coercive power of the state, religion is in danger, and on the 
other hand, without the shari’a the state becomes a tyrannical 
organization.36
This is the beginning of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As the King became 
more and more powerful he spread Wahhabism within the borders of the 
Kingdom. Thus, the House of Saud found a way to integrate itself with the 
religion of Islam to secure a tranquil, domestic society. This would form 
the bedrock of the Saudi identity and is the reason that they are so deeply 
religious. As a means of generating a cohesive Saudi identity, the Kingdom 
pushed an Islamic identity. Wahhabism is also the dominant government 
philosophy as a necessity to fully enforce it throughout the entirety of 
society.37 The government using a Wahhabist framework as their state, 
translated it into a foreign policy.38 This allowed them to push for legitimacy 
in dominating the Arabian Peninsula, to be a leader and founder of the 
Arab League and maintain sovereignty over the two holy cities.
While Saudi Arabia sees itself as the supreme religious authority 
for Islam, being the caretaker of the two holy Islamic cities and having a 
strong Wahhabist ideological support, there is a strong challenge from Iran 
as leader of the Islamic faithful. “Iran, where most citizens are ethnically 
Persian and not Arab, is the largest Shi‘ite country in the world, with over 90 
percent of its residents identifying as such.”39 As previously stated earlier, 
   36    Ibid.
   37    Yury Barmin, “Can Mohammed bin Salman Break the Saudi-Wahhabi Pact?” Al 
Jazeera, January 7, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mohammed-bin-
salman-break-saudi-wahhabi-pact-180107091158729.html 
   38    Athina Tzemprin, Jugoslav Jozić, and Henry Lambare, “The Middle East Cold War: 
Iran-Saudi Arabia and the Way Ahead,” 3ROLWLþND0LVDR 52, nos. 4-5 (2015), 187-202. 
https://hrcak.srce.hr/159926.
   39    Jill Ricotta, “The Arab Shi‘a Nexus: Understanding Iran’s Influence In the Arab 
World,” 7KH:DVKLQJWRQ4XDUWHUO\ 39, no. 2 (2016): 139-154.
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Iran not only ideologically challenges the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy 
but is also in a struggle for power in the Middle East. Islam in the Iranian 
context creates a different identity:
Since the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the country’s government 
has been based on guidance of Shi‘i clerics. Founded under 
the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran was born out of a movement among Shi‘i clerics (led by 
Khomeini), started in the 1960s that advocated for an active 
role of the clerics in politics. Khomeini spoke eloquently about 
his desire to export the revolution and bring justice through 
Islam to all. However, many clerics in the Arab world still abide 
by the more traditional quietist role that only provides clerics 
the opportunity to involve themselves in politics in the most dire 
situations.40
Since the Revolution, Iran has experienced a gigantic shift in the nature of 
its government. Rather than being led by a devout Muslim monarch, i.e. the 
Shah, the nation was to be ruled by the religious leaders themselves. The 
Ayatollah desired one thing: the end of injustices to Muslims across the 
world. This was not exclusive to only Shia Muslims but also included Sunnis, 
and, from the Ayatollah’s perspective, there was no greater injustice than 
the Saudi Monarchy. The Saudi King had supported the oppressive Shah 
and monarchies across the entire region, something that, according to the 
Ayatollah, was inherently un-Islamic.41 To Iranians, the Saudi monarchy is 
representative of a perversion of the faith that is seeking to use Islam to 
justify their own personal power rather than adhering to the tenets of the 
faith. 
This conflict of identity has translated across the entire Middle 
East. Saudi Arabia has seen the physical exportation of the revolution 
across the region and the inflammation of sectarian tensions as a result. 
Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a secular Sunni-led government that 
was vehemently anti-Iranian.42 The regime was very much afraid of an 
exportation of the Iranian revolution to the majority Shia population and 
was constantly deporting Shi‘ites out of the country to Iran and other 
nations.43 This led to uprisings that were violently suppressed by the Iraqi 
army.44 The only nation to attempt to support these uprisings and accept 
these refugees was Iran. As a result, Iran gained an enormous amount of 
   40    Ibid., 141
   41    Fürtig, 629.
   42    Ricotta, 139-140.
   43   Ibid.
   44   Ibid., 142.
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soft power and respect for Arab Shi‘ites, who have been largely ignored by 
the larger population of Arab Sunnis.45 Iran has sought to lead all Shi‘ites 
regardless of their ethnic origin. In the gulf region Iran has been looking to 
exploit the Arab Shia populations who have experienced similar situations 
to the Iraqi Shia Arabs:
The history of both the Saudi and Bahraini communities involves 
a significant political, cultural, social, and religious repression 
by the state. In Bahrain, the majority Shi‘a population has been 
ruled by a Sunni dominated monarchy that, similar to Iraq in 
1991, during the Arab Spring brutally repressed an uprising 
demanding equal rights. The Bahraini government received 
support from its allies in the Gulf, who sent in troops to help 
quash the movement. The protests originally were not framed 
as a sectarian battle, but once the state and its allies intervened 
violently, the Shi‘a and outside observers began to question 
the motives at play.46
The leadership of Iran has seen a window of opportunity with the 
populations and has sought to create more revolutions in the Gulf states to 
further increase their influence among those they consider the oppressed 
faithful. Iran willingly lends its support to the oppressed groups in order to 
gain the ability to project their dominance as the true leader of the faith to 
the Saudi monarchy: 
Often allegiance to Iran also comes from a misunderstanding of 
the popular tradition of flying the flags of Lebanese Hezbollah, 
Iran’s most valued proxy, and photos of Khomeini and current 
Supreme Leader Khamenei, which stand-in as symbols for the 
broader Shi‘a community. Usually, Shi‘a are merely expressing 
pride in and solidarity with Shi‘i Islam as a culture rather than 
politically dedicating themselves to these groups. Nevertheless, 
it stokes fear in many Sunni onlookers and political elites, who 
see any relationship with Iran as being nefarious in nature, 
similar to the Iraqi case.47
This is not always a conflict that requires arms to gain power. The image 
of Saudi citizens hoisting an Iranian flag and a picture of the Ayatollah is 
a powerful one to the King of Saudi Arabia. It represents not only support 
for the chief enemy of the state, but also supporting Shia Islam. This is 
   45   Ibid., 144.
   46   Ibid., 142.
   47   Ibid., 141.
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a direct challenge to the identity of Saudi Arabia and how it sees itself. It 
challenges the belief that Saudi Arabia is the leader of the Muslim world. 
With this assault on their identity, Saudi Arabia internalizes it and seeks 
to show that it is the most powerful Muslim nation on the planet. In doing 
so, it reflects on its ideology to see what the Kingdom needs in order to 
further its power. Saudi Arabia recognizes the power of a nuclear weapons 
program and would seek to start its own in the face of the assault on its 
core identity by Iran. 
Of the two theoretical paradigms, realism explains Saudi Arabia’s 
desire for nuclear weapons better than a constructivist interpretation. This 
is because the Saudi identity does not necessarily translate well into a 
foreign policy goal beyond uniting Muslims under a single banner. The 
Saudi identity is incredibly well crafted to create domestic cohesion and 
loyalty to the Crown, but not to create foreign policy goals. The King of 
Saudi Arabia is the protector of the two holy Mosques, not the sword of the 
righteous. If the threat came from a Western nuclear power, then a counter 
nuclear deterrent would be more feasible. This is because the King is 
defending the Holy Land from heretics of a completely different faith, thus 
justifying more drastic action. While the Saudi identity is under attack from 
Iran, it does not grant the Kingdom proper provocation to seek a nuclear 
weapon as a way to protect themselves from a verbal Iranian offensive. 
However, realism offers a very logical explanation as to why Saudi Arabia 
desires a nuclear weapon. As Iran gains more power in the region, both 
militarily and with greater influence over other nations, it provides a serious 
challenge to the vital avenues of wealth for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
As all of the oil wealth of the Kingdom must leave the Persian Gulf via the 
Strait of Hormuz, which is controlled in part by Iran, or the pipelines through 
Iraq and Syria, which are both under heavy Iranian influence.48  In addition, 
Iran has been a well-known sponsor of terror groups that have carried out 
attacks in the region and in Saudi Arabia itself.49 As Iran grows in power it 
will undoubtedly seek to dominate the peninsula. As Saudi power is unable 
to keep up it will seek an equalizer to stave off any possible invasion of its 
sovereignty. A nuclear deterrent very well would be a real addition to the 
power of Saudi Arabia that would provide it with means of defending itself 
and surrounding allies in the face of an Iranian threat.   
   48   Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, and Danielle Pletka, “Research Report: 
Iranian Influence in the Levant, Iraq, and Afghanistan,” American Enterprise Institute 
(2008), 
   49   Ibid.
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